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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

of a potato harvesting machine, the court does indicate in its
opinion that the duty of a manufacturer extends to product design.27
Automobile design reflects a basic public policy question. The
design of a complex product such as an automobile takes into
account safety of operation. However, this safety objective competes
with other public demands of the manufacturer's product. These
demands are economy, style, and speed and performance. It seems
that if Schemel's case had gone to the jury that causation would
have been extremely difficult to prove. Arguably, the driver of
the automobile manufactured by General Motors Corporation could
be considered an intervening force cutting off the chain of causation.
Perhaps it would be desirable to restrict the speed and performance capabilities of an automobile as suggested by the plaintiff
in Schemel. However, it is doubtful that the judiciary will ever
28
impose the duty. Clearly, the legislature has not chosen to do so.
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doctors performed a Caesarean section operation

on the plaintiff, and left a surgical sponge inside her body. Believing
she had a tumor, the plaintiff underwent surgery more than four
years later, and the sponge was then discovered. The plaintiff
filed suit for malpractice against the doctors, but the District
Court, Lubbock County, granted defendant's motion for a summary
judgment based on the two-year Statute of Limitations. This judgment was affirmed on appeal. The Supreme Court of Texas, two
judges dissenting,1 reversed the judgments of the trial and appellate courts, and remanded the cause for trial. The court held
that the Statute of Limitations does not commence to run until
the cause of action is discovered, rather than when the negligence
occurred. Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1967).
The primary question raised in this case is whether the Statute
of Limitations regarding a malpractice action begins to run at the
time of the operation, or at the time the negligent act is discomplaint did state a cause of action on either a theory of negligence or implied warranty. The main issue In the case, however, concerned the manufacturer's

defense of

privity of contract which the court did not allow.
27. Lindenberg v. Folson, 138 N.W.2d 573 (N.D. 1965).
28. 33 Fed. Reg. 6465-6470 (1968). Some of the recent safety standards have to do
with the following: door latches, hinges, and locks; windshield wiping and washing
systems; windshield defrosting and defogging systems; headlamp concealment devices;
and hood latch systems.
1. Griffin and Walker, J. Griffin stated that to adopt the discovery doctrine would
lead to hopeless confusion and destroy the "cut-off" point which the legislature had
already established. He felt that the court had no right to pass leglslatlon to Change
the Statute of Limitations.

RECENT CASES

covered by the patient. In other words, when did the cause of
2
action accrue?
Generally, there are three rules which the courts use to determine when the Statute of Limitations commences to run with regard
to an action for malpractice. The first rule is that the limitations
period begins to run at the time of the negligent act. The second
holds that the limitation period does not begin to run until the
relationship between the physician and patient has ended. This is
more commonly known as the "continuing treatment" rule. The
third rule, referred to as the discovery rule, states that the Statute
of Limitations does not commence to run until the negligent performance of the physician is discovered by the patient.
The harshness of the first two rules will become apparent after
a discussion of all three rules, for what seems to be a proper right
of action by a patient against a physician will often be denied
through the application of the former two rules, whereas the same
action will generally be allowed when the discovery rule is applied. The rationale of this rule is exemplified by the following
comment:
All too often in the past, in cases of inherently unknowable malpractice, of which the foreign object cases are a
classic example, where the victim is generally unlikely to
learn of the harm before the remedy expires, justice has
been buried under an avalanche of cases applying the
harsh general rule that blameless ignorance of the injury
does not prevent the bar from operating. 8
The discovery rule should be more readily adopted by the courts,
since it is the only truly fair rule which can be applied in a suit
for malpractice.
Most jurisdictions still adhere to the rule that the Statute of
Limitations commences to run at the time of the negligent act.'
The reasoning behind the literal application of the Statute to bar
an action in these cases is to protect the defendant not only from
fictitious claims, but also against the difficulty of obtaining evidence
after a lapse of time even when he is confronted with a genuine
claim.5
Furthermore, difficulty is often encountered by the interpretation of the particular statute in each jurisdiction. The Texas statute
in the present case reads as follows:
2. CaPpuci v. Barone, 266 Mass. 578, 165 N.E. 653 (1919).
3. Comments of Recent Important Personal Itnjury (Tort) Cases, 28 NAACA L.T.
158 (1962).
4. E.g., Hill v. Hayes, 193 Kan. 453, 895 P.2d 298 (1964); Pasquale v. Chandler,
350 Mass. 450, 215 N.E.2d 319 (1966); Cloutier v. Kasbeta, 105 N.H. 262, 197 A.2d 627
(1964); McCluskey v. Thranow, 31 Wis.2d 245, 142 N.W.2d 787 (1966).
6. Paussim, HANDsoox op T
LAW Or TORTS, § 80 (3rd ed. 1964).
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There shall be commenced and prosecuted within two
years after the cause of action shall have accrued, and
not afterward, all actions or suits in court of the following description: .. .. Action for injury done to the person
of another. 6
Other states have similar statutes.7 A Kansas court, in deciding
against a plaintiff in a similar action, interpreted such a statute
and determined that the legislature had specifically stated that the
Statute of Limitations begins to run when the cause of action accrues,
meaning at the time of the operation, and refused to follow the
doctrine of discovery. 8
The New York courts have also rejected the discovery rule.9
In a case where a sponge was left inside a patient after an appendectomy, and was not discovered until five years later, the
court held that the action was barred by the Statute of Limitations.
The court further stated that the injury occurred at the time of
the operation and that the damage was done then, and not when
the pain was first felt-"pain is the result of the injury, not the
injury itself." 10
The second rule, which is closely related to the doctrine
that the limitation period commences to run at the time of the
negligent act, is known as the "continuing treatment" rule. The
Ohio courts have consistently followed this rule, 1 which states
that the Statute of Limitations does not commence to run during
the continuance of the relationship of physician and patient, unless
the patient has discovered or should have discovered the injury
during this time.1 2 It should be noted that when this relationship
has terminated, the limitations period will commence, and a negli.
gent act performed by the physician must be detected within the
statutory period. This typifies the close relationship that the "continuing treatment" rule has with the first rule mentioned.
The third general rule applied by the courts is referred to as
the discovery rule. This rule is, as stated by the court in the
6. TEL ANN. Crv. S'rT. art. 5526, (Vernon 1958).
7. E.g., CA. Como orsCIVm Pnoc Durm, 1 240 (West 1954); MNm.
STAT. ANN. 1 541.0
(1967); N.D. CENT. CODi § 28-01-18 (1960). Section 28-01-18 reads:
Actions having two years limitations-The following actions must
be commenced within two years after the cause of action has accrued:
3. An action for the recovery of damages resulting from malpractice.
8. Hill v. Hayes, 193 Kan. 453, 395 P.2d 298 (1964).
9. E.g., Conklin v. Draper, 254 N.Y. 620, 178 N.E. 892 (1930) ; Dorfman v. Schoenfield,
26 Mlsc.2d 87, 203 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1960,) ; Gross v. W18% 16 A.D.2d 682, 227 N.Y.S.Id 528
(1962).
10. Dorfman v. Schoenfleld, 26 Mis2d, 208 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1960). Although the court
stated that it was within the competency of the courts to make a change In the New
York law regarding malpractice cases, it did not feel that the Special Term court should
take the initiative.
11. E.g., DeLong v. Campbell, 157 Ohio St. 22, 104 NJm2G 171A (1952); Lundberg v.
Bay View Hospital, 175 Ohio St. 199, 191 N.E.2d 821 (1968).
12. Lundgerg v. Bay View Hospital, 175 Ohio St. 199, 191 N.3.2d 821 (1963).
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instant case, being embraced by a growing number of courts.'

Many courts have recently adopted the discovery rule by overruling past decisions in their jurisdiction which had previously

followed the older rule."

Under the discovery rule, a cause of

action "accrues" when the patient discovered or should have discovered the defendant's negligent act, rather than when the defendant performed the operation. 1 5 In a discussion over the difficulty
of interpreting the word "accrue" an Oregon court determined
that legislative inaction to specifically define the meaning of the
word with regard to undiscovered malpractice actions did not

necessarily mean that the legislature desired no change in the
meaning of the word as interpreted previously by the courts."6

One of the recent federal cases has also accepted the discovery
rule as prevailing."7 In discussing an earlier Supreme Court ruling, 18
the court stated that there is no sound reason why the government
should escape liability because its negligence was such as to remain

undisputed for years thereafter. 19
In a more recent federal case involving alleged negligence on
the part of a Veterans' Administration surgeon in performing a
tendon transplant operation the court held that the patient would
be entitled to bring a malpractice action against the United States

within two years after the patient discovered, or in the exercise
of reasonable diligence should have discovered,

the existence of

20
the acts of malpractice upon which his claim was based.

The position of the New York courts has previously been set
forth, and a study of the decisions of the California courts shows
the conflicts which exist among the present views. A number of
courts in California follow the "continuing treatment" rule,2 but
22
the trend seems to be toward the acceptance of the discovery rule.
13. Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577, 578 (Tex. (1967).
14. E.g., Billings v. Sisters of Mercy of Idaho, 86 Idaho 485, 389 P.2d 224 (1964):
Johnson v. St. Patrick's Hospital, 417 P.2d 469 (Mont. 1906); Morgan v. Grace Hospital
Inc., 149 W. Va. 783, 144 S.E.2d 156 (1966), where the court said that the discovery
rule represents a distinct and marked trend in recent decisions.
16. Berry v. Branner, 421 P.2d 996 (Ore. 1966).
16. Id. at 998. The court stated that legislative Inaction "in a weak reed upon which
to lean" in determining legislative Intent. The court further said that to take away one's
remedy before he has or can reasonably be expected to have knowledge of any wrong
inflicted upon him is patently inconsistent and unrealistic.
17. Quinton v. United States, 304 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1962).
18. Urie v. Thompson, 837 U.S. 163 (1949).
19. Quinton v. United States, supra note 17, at 240. In this case the plaintiffs wife
was given three incorrect blood transfusions at an Air Force base bospitaL The error
was discovered over three years later during the wife's pregnancy, with the resuit that
she gave birth to a stillborn child and could not safely bear other children.
20. Johnson v. United States, 271 F.Supp. 205 (W.D. Ark. 1967).
21. E.g., Garlock v. Cole, 199 Cal. App.2d 11, 18 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1962); Myers v.
Stephenson, 125 Cal. App.2d 399, 270 P.2d 885 (1954).
22. E.g., Weinstock v. Eissler, 224 Cal. App.2d 212, 86 Cal. Rptr. 587 (1964); Tell
v. Taylor, 191 Cal. App.2d 266, 12 Cal. Rptr. 648 (1961); Hemingway v. Waxler, 128
Cal. App.2d 68, 274 P.2d 699 (1954).
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Wisconsin courts have taken the position that the period of
limitation commences on the date the act of malpractice occurred,
and not on the date that the malpractice was discovered.23
Minnesota follows the "continuing treatment" rule and holds
that with the absence of fraud, the Statute of Limitations is suspended as long as the relationship of physician and patient continues
2
as to a particular condition he is employed to cure. '
Nebraska 2

5

Michigan, 2

and Montana 27

courts, on the other

hand, have recently concluded that the cause of action in a malpractice suit does not accrue until the patient discovers, or should
have discovered, that a foreign object had been left in his body.
Insofar as cases involving foreign objects left in the body,
there are no North Dakota decisions directly in point. However,
two North Dakota cases seem to indicate the probability of future
adoption of the discovery rule.
In Milde v. Leigh,2 8 a 1947 case, a doctor performed an ineffective sterilization operation on a woman, and the woman thereafter gave birth to a child, with the result that her health was
impaired. The court held that the cause of action did not arise at
the time of the previous operation, but at the time the woman
became pregnant. Furthermore, in rejecting the New York court
rulings, the North Dakota court stated that a cause of action does
not accrue until the party owning it is entitled to begin and prosecute
an action thereon; "it accrues at the moment when he has a legal
right to sue upon it and no earlier." 29
This approach is still followed, as indicated by the 1968 case
0
of Iverson v. Lancaster."
In this case a physician negligently failed
to diagnose the plaintiff's hypertension as due to a contraction of
the aorta, and advised her that she should have a hysterectomy.
The hysterectomy was performed on February 27, 1959. On June
27, 1962, the physician discovered that the plaintiff had a contraction
of the aorta and advised corrective surgery. This operation was
subsequently performed, eliminating the plaintiff's hypertension. An
action for malpractice was brought in June, 1964. The court did
not allow the defendant physician's defense that the Statute of
23.

McCluskey v. Thranow, 81 Wis.2d 245, 142 N.W.2d 787 (1966). The court reasoned

that since the legislature did not see fit to toll the Statute of Timitations until discovery

of the tort, the court could not make an exceptioni in this case.
24. Coulllard v. Charles T. Miller Hospital, Inc., 253 Minn. 418, 92 N.W.2d 96 (1958).
25. Spath v. Morrow, 174 Neb. 88, 115 N.W.2d 581 (1963) [Suture needle left In
plaintiffs body after delivery of child].
26. Johnson v. Caldwell, 871 Mich. 868, 128 N.W.2d 785 (1963). [Physician negligently
told patient that nothing could be done for her condition].
27. Johnson v. St. Patrick's Hospital, 417 P.2d 469 (Mont. 1966). [Surgical sponge
left in plaintiff's body following a hip operation].
28. 75 N.D. 418, 28 N.W.2d 580 (1947).
29. Milde v. Leigh, eupro note $8, st 587.
80. 158 N.Wjd 507 (N.D. 1968).
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Limitations had run, stating that "the limitation period commences
to run against a malpractice action from the time the act of malpractice with resulting injury is, or by reasonable diligence could
be, discovered." 31
It seems that of the three rules adopted by the courts, the
decisions which follow the discovery rule are the most reasonable.
Understandably, if a patient is aware that he has been the victim
of a negligent act immediately after an operation, the Statute of
Limitations will commence to run at that time. But in other
situations it may be highly improbable, if not impossible, for the
average person, with limited medical knowledge, to understand that
he has been harmed to the extent that a cause of action has arisen.
To disallow a patient a right of action merely because that
action did not appear within a statutory period following an operation does not seem to be an accurate portrayal of a judicial system
which seeks justice as its ultimate goal. The jurisdictions which
follow the two harsh rules should consider the inequities which
have resulted from their decisions. The result of such reflection
would presumably have the effect of increasing the trend toward
a more universal adoption of the discovery rule.
HANS B. BORSTAD
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